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STEWART v. COMMONWEALTH
245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394 (1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On May 12, 1991, Kenneth Manuel Stewart went to the home of his
estranged wife and five-month-old son and shot his wife in the forehead
at close-range. After she fell, Stewart shot her a second time in the front
of the skull. He then proceeded downstairs and shot his son twice at close
range, shooting him in the side of the head. Stewart then carried his son's
body upstairs and placed it in the arms of Mrs. Stewart's body. Before
leaving the house, he turned off the kitchen stove in which his estranged
wife had been cooking a casserole, put the family dogs on the back porch
and closed both doors, turned on Mrs. Stewart's answering machine, got
herhouse key, and locked the house. Finally, Stewart drove his wife's car
to New York, rather than his olderpickup truck, and discarded themurder
weapon.
During the guilt phase of Stewart's capital murder trial, photo-
graphs of blood spatters taken at the scene were shown in evidence by a
forensic evidence technician employed by the Commonwealth. The
testimony of the blood-spatter expert was a surprise to the defendant. The
Commonwealth employed the expert on the Sunday evening before the
trial was to begin. On Monday afternoon, the expert discussed his
conclusions with the Commonwealth, but made no written report. On the
morning of the second day of trial, the Commonwealth's attorney finally
told defense counsel that he planned to use a blood spatter expert to
interpret the blood stains in photographs taken at the scene. That evening,
the expert told defense counsel essentially what he would say at trial, and
offered to provide a list of other blood spatter experts located in other
police departments. Instead, defense counsel telephoned an expert in
Alabama, but was unable to retain him because of the cost. The next day,
the court denied defense counsel's motions for a recess and for court
appointment of a blood spatter expert for the defense. The
Commonwealth's expert supplied a list of other experts, and defense
counsel contacted one of them, but did not ask him to testify the next day.
Before the Commonwealth's expert testified, defense counsel again
moved for a continuance, and again the motion was denied. Basing his
opinion on the photographs, the Commonwealth's expert witness testi-
fied as to his opinion of the significance of the blood spatters in
reconstructing the crime scene, which among other things indicated that
Stewart's wife had been "thrown violently up toward the head of the bed
after she had been lying with her forehead resting upon the lower part of
a spread that covered the bed." I
Pretrial, Stewart had been evaluated by a mental health expert
appointed by the court to assist him under Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1. When defense counsel gave notice to the Commonwealth of its
1 Stewart v. Comnonwealth, 245 Va. 222,238,427 S.E.2d 394,404
(1993).
2 Id. at 248, 427 S.E.2d at 411.
3 The defendant assigned 44 errors. Some of these the court rejected
in brief, conclusive language. Others did not involve death penalty law.
On still others, the rulings provide little if any guidance because they
apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case
being reviewed. Issues in these categories that will not be addressed in
this summary include: (1) Commonwealth's refusal to comply with
discovery request on factual basis for vileness aggravating factor; (2)
trial court's refusal to allow defendant additional peremptory strikes
during voir dire; (3) trial court's refusal to allow individual voir dire
examination; (4) rejection of defendant's arguments that the capital
murder indictment was unconstitutional on the basis that: (a) both the
intent to use the mental health expert, a reciprocal examination by the
Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Arthur Centor, was ordered under Virginia
Code section 19.2-264.3:1(F). That section states:
1. If the attorney for the defendant gives notice pursuant
to subsection E and the Commonwealth thereafter seeks an
evaluation concerning the existence or absence of mitigating
circumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at
the time of the offense, the court shall appoint one or more
qualified experts to perform such an evaluation. The court
shall order the defendant to submit to such an evaluation, and
advise the defendant on the record in court that a refusal to
cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert could result in
exclusion of the defendant's expert evidence. The qualifica-
tion of the experts shall be governed by subsection A. The
location of the evaluation shall be governed by § 19.2-169.5
B. The attorney for the Commonwealth shall be responsible
for providing the experts the information specified in § 19.2-
169.5 C. After performing their evaluation, the experts shall
report their findings and opinions and provide copies of
psychiatric, psychological, medical or other records obtained
during the course of the evaluation to the attorneys for the
Commonwealth and the defense.
2. If the court finds, after hearing evidence presented by
the parties, out of the presence of the jury, that the defendant
has refused to cooperate with an evaluation requested by the
Commonwealth, the court may admit evidence of such refusal
or, in the discretion of the court, bar the defendant from
presenting his expert evidence.
Dr. Centor did not prepare a report mentioning future dangerousness
under this statutory subsection.
At the penalty trial, Dr. Centor testified that the defendant would be
dangerous in the future, alleging that his expert opinion was based not on
evidence derived from any statements by Stewart, but rather on the
circumstances of the case, Stewart's prior record and results of Stewart's
psychological tests.
HOLDING
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Stewart's
death sentence. 2 The court ruled, inter alia,3 that the trial court did not
vileness and future dangerousness aggravating factors are too vague,
resulting in unlimited and unguided jury discretion, (b) Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment, (c)
constitutional provisions against double jeopardy prohibit the use of
prior convictions and unadjudicated criminal conduct to establish future
dangerousness, (d) Virginia defendants are denied meaningful appellate
review because the Supreme Court of Virginia has never set aside a death
sentence for misapplication of an aggravating factor and has refused to
consider challenges to the "vileness" factor when there was also a finding
of future dangerousness, (e) 50-page limitation on brief set in Rule 5:26
does not provide meaningful appellate review for capital defendant, and
(f) jury should have been instructed as to parole eligibility; (5) trial
court's allowance of video cameras in courtroom during defendant's
trial; (6) exclusion of venire member for his stated religious beliefs
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err in refusing defendant's proposed jury instructions to ensure that the
jurors could consider life imprisonment over death.4 Further, the court
ruled that the forensic psychologist expert who was appointed on behalf
of the Commonwealth to evaluate defendant concerning the presence or
absence of mitigating factors relating to defendant's mental condition
could evaluate future dangerousness as well. 5 The Court upheld the
finding of vileness 6 and ruled that future dangerousness did not have to
be considered because the jury's separate finding of vileness was




In Wainwright v. Witt,8 the United States Supreme Court held that
the prosecution can exclude venire members from sitting on a capital jury
if their attitude towards the death penalty would prevent or substantially
impair their ability to consider the death penalty as an option. Since that
decision, there have been attempts by defense counsel to make a
"reverse-Witt" inquiry which would allow the defense to exclude those
venire members who are too "pro-death." The Supreme Court ruled that
"reverse-Witt" examination must be allowed in Morgan v. Illinois.9 The
exact formulation of this questioning is unsettled in Virginia.
In Stewart, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's
refusal to permit the following questions:
[1] Would you be of the opinion that [death is] the appropriate
penalty for all persons found guilty of first degree murder when
there are aggravating factors proven that Virginia has set out in
the definition of capital murder?
[2] Would you be of the opinion that death is the appropriate
penalty for all persons found guilty of capital murder when the
Commonwealth has proved certain aggravating factors to be
taken into account at sentencing?10
Although the second question is more specific, and thus allows
venire members a narrower scope on which to base their answers, the
court held that the trial court correctly excluded those questions because
they provided no factual basis upon which a prospective juror could
express an opinion.1t However, the trial court did allow defendant to ask
two other "reverse-Witt" questions that, according to the court, enabled
the defendant to inquire if venire members would consider life imprison-
ment if he was found guilty of capital murder. They were:
[I] [I]f you find the accused guilty of capital murder, and the
Court gave you the option of death or a life sentence.. .could
against the death penalty; (7) retention of venire member who was wife
of a policeman; (8) admission into evidence of a videotape of the crime
scene, shown to the jury without sound; and (9) admission of hearsay
testimony that defendant and his estranged wife had consulted an
attorney about separation or divorce.
Defense counsel is to be commended for preserving those issues for
federal review and assigning 44 errors.
4 Stewart, 245 Va. at 244-45, 427 S.E.2d at 409.
5 Id. at 243, 427 S.E.2d at 407-08.
6 Id. at 246, 427 S.E.2d at 409.
7 Id. at 246, 427 S.E.2d at 410.
8 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
9 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). See case summary of Morgan, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 4 (1992).
10 Stewart, 245 Va. at 233, 427 S.E.2d at 402.
you fairly consider both options, or would you automatically
conclude that death was the appropriate sentence?
[2] Would you be of the opinion that death is the appropriate
penalty for all persons found guilty of capital murder when the
prosecution has proven certain aggravating factors, even when
the Judge has instructed you that you still have the option of a
life sentence? 12
Whatever the precise formulation, it is imperative that defense
counsel conduct "reverse-Witt"jury questioning and make every reason-
able effort to determine if a prospective juror's affinity for the death
penalty would substantially impair her ability to follow the law.
II. Expert Assistance and Ake v. Oklahoma
The prosecution surprised Stewart with a blood-spatter expert.
Defense counsel acted properly and moved as soon as possible for his
own expert to be appointed to permit him to intelligently confront the
Commonwealth's expert. 13 Although the opinion does not reflect that
the motion was grounded onAke v. Oklahoma,14 that decision may have
and should have been the authority relied upon.
In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that under certain
circumstances, an indigent capital defendant is entitled to court appoint-
ment of a mental health professional who will help evaluate a defense,
present it, and cross-examine a prosecution witness. Ake dealt with the
need for a psychiatrist when insanity was at issue, but the decision in that
case has been construed to require appointment of other experts for the
defense when it is essential to a fair trial that the prosecutor's evidence
be confronted. 15 A significant showing is required under Ake to satisfy
the court that the requested defense expert is essential to due process in
the context of a particular case. Defense attorneys confronted with
evidence such as that offered by the Commonwealth's blood spatter
expert in Stewart; however, should seek appointment of their own expert,
based on Ake, if the trial court is determined to allow "blood- spatter
expert" testimony. However, admission of this testimony for either side
is objectionable. Such "experts" are no more qualified than jurors to
interpret blood spatters, certainly not from merely examining photo-
graphs.
III. Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.3:1
The Supreme Court of Virginia's treatment in Stewart of issues
raised by Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1 (often referred to simply as
3:1) is puzzling, given the plain language of the statute. For example, the
Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Centor, was appointed under the reciprocal
provision of the statute, subsection (E). Dr. Centor testified about his
11 Id.
12 Id. at 234, 427 S.E.2d at 402.
13 Id. at 237, 427 S.E. 2d at 404-05.
14 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Indeed, the court in Stewart cited only Britt
v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (finding that before a court shall
appoint an expert, the defendant must show that the expert is necessary
as a basic tool of an adequate defense).
15 See, e.g., O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491
(1988) (court appointment of forensic expert for defense); United States
v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 1128, (5th Cir. 1984) (fingerprint specialist);
Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975) (firearms expert);
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d. 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) (pathologist); Bowen
v. Eyman, 324 F.Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 1970) (serologist). See also Thorton
v. State, 339 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. 1986) (dental expert); Patterson v. State,
232 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1977) (narcotics analyst).
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finding that Stewart would be dangerous in the future, without providing
defense counsel a report of that finding.
Another of Stewart's assignments of error arising from Dr. Centor's
testimony was that the plain language of 3:1 limits the examination by the
Commonwealth expert to the "existence or absence of mitigating cir-
cumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
offense," 16 and thus could not encompass future dangerousness. The
court's rejection of this assignment of error was unresponsive. The court
said that the notice given to the defense that a reciprocal examination
would be conducted adequately notified defense counsel that Dr. Centor
would seek evidence against Stewart's interest. However, Stewart's
claim was not about the sufficiency of notice, but rather that an exam for
future dangerousness was not authorized by the statute.
Stewart did make a separate claim relating to notice, but the court
again apparently ignored the plain language of the statute. Stewart
complained that Dr. Centor's written report did not mention his opinion
as to Stewart's future dangerousness. The court responded:
Stewart does not claim that Dr. Centor prepared a written
report on the subject of Stewart's future dangerousness. Nor
does he dispute the trial court's factual finding that Stewart had
an expert in the same field as Dr. Centor and that, atleastaweek
prior to trial, Stewart was told that Dr. Centor would testify
about the issue of future dangerousness. Under these circum-
stances, we conclude that the court did not err in permitting this
testimony.
17
The court did not address the 3:1(F) requirement that the
Commonwealth's reciprocal experts, after performing their evaluation,
"shall report their findings and opinions and provide copies of...records
obtained during the course of the evaluation to the attorneys for the
Commonwealth and the defense." Sanctioning oral notification of future
dangerousness testimony a week before trial approves of little more than
trial by ambush. In particular, it does not permit defense counsel who did
not plan to offer expert testimony (as Stewart apparently did not) to
secure evidence about the general unreliability of future dangerousness
testimony.
18
Finally, in a transparent attempt to evade both the requirements of
3:1 and the constitutional constraints of Estelle v. Smith,19 Dr. Centor
claimed that his opinion was based not on Stewart's statements, but
rather on the circumstances of the case, Stewart's prior criminal record
and the results of Stewart's psychological tests. The trial court, having
previously ruled that Dr. Centor could not base his opinions on any
statements made by Stewart during the examination, accepted this
assertion. The Supreme Court of Viriginia rejected Stewart's assignment
of error based on this testimony. The court failed to discuss 3: l's further
16 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F) (1990).
17 Stewart, 245 Va. at 243-44,427 S.E.2d at 408.
18 See J. Marquart, S. Ekland-Olson and J. Sorensen, Gazing Into
the Ciystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict Dangerousness in
Capital Cases?, 23 Law & Society Rev. 449 (1989). See also J. Marquart
and J. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates:
Assessing the Threat to Societyfrom Capital Offenders., 23 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 5 (1989).
19451 U.S.454 (1981) (holding that a violation of defendant's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination when defendant had not
been warned prior to a court-ordered psychiatric exam that he could
remain silent, and that any statements he made during exam could be used
against him during penalty phase).2 0 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(G) (1990) (emphasis added).
21 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(G) provides in part: "[No
evidence derived from any such statements or disclosures may be
introduced against the defendant at the sentencing phase of a capital
murder trial for the purpose of proving the aggravating circumstances
prohibition of use by the Commonwealth's expert of any "evidence
derived from any such statements or disclosures" by the defendant
during the evaluation. 20 Obviously, results of psychological tests are
derived from the defendant's statements, though it is not clear whether
the tests were given during the evaluation.
The same assertion that defendant's statements were not involved
in Dr. Centor's opinion apparently permitted Dr. Centor to avoid the
statute's requirement that they not be used to prove aggravating factors,
but could only be used in rebuttal. 21 There is no indication that Dr.
Centor's testimony was in rebuttal to anything offered by Stewart.
The court's treatment (or non-treatment) of 3:1 issues suggests
several options for defense practice. Under 3:1(C), defense counsel is
required to file a written report, but Stewart clearly indicates that, in
fairness, there can be no requirement that itbe a complete report. Defense
counsel should communicate orally with the defense expert. Where the
statute requires, for example, that the written report advise whether there
are mitigating factors other than those listed in Virginia Code section
19.2-264.4, the written report should state only, "There are."
Future dangerousness predictions are suspect, even when based on
evaluations conducted in a professionally acceptable manner. They are
even more suspect when they are not based on a personal evaluation at
all.22 Defense attorneys would be well advised, upon receipt of notice
that the Commonwealth will rely on future dangerousness, to seek
appointment of an expert on the subject of the reliability of future
dangerousness testimony.
23
Finally, the court's interpretation of 3:1 in Stewart suggests re-
examination by defense counsel of the usefulness of the statute and calls
for consideration of three difficult tactical options. One, expert assis-
tance in mitigation can be sought under Ake, with the claim that 3:1
burdens defendant's right to present mitigation evidence. Two, a defen-
dant has the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel notified of an
evaluation that will encompass future dangerousness.24 Arguably, the
right to counsel means the right to have counsel function as counsel.
Defense counsel may insist on being present at the Commonwealth's
reciprocal exam in order to protect the defendant's rights. Three, al-
though 3:1 allows, but does not mandate, preclusion of defendant's
expert mitigation evidence for failure to cooperate with the Common-
wealth expert, preclusion of defendant's expert mitigation evidence may
be unconstitutional. 25 A capital defendant may be entitled to put on
expert evidence in mitigation without cooperating with the Common-
wealth expert.
In summary, the Supreme Court of Virginia has made using the
statutory rights granted by 3:1 difficult. It has also, however, created
federal constitutional issues that may result in relief if those issues are
raised and properly preserved.
Summary and analysis by:
Mari Karen Simmons
specified in § 19.2-264.4. Such statements or disclosures shall be admis-
sible in rebuttal only when relevant to issues in mitigation raised by the
defense."
22 Grisso and Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of
Future Violence?, 16 L. & Hum. Behav. 621 (1992).
23 The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse can assist in securing
testimony of a qualified expert in this area.
24 SeeSatterwhite v. Texas,486 U.S. 249 (1988), and case summary
of Satterwhite, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 14 (1988); and
Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989), and case summary of Powell,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 9 (1989).
25 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.284 (1973); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (holding that it is unconstitutional to
force defendant to make a choice between constitutional rights); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)
(holding that procedural barriers to presentation of mitigation evidence
are impermissible). See also Bennett, Is Preclusion Under Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.3:1 Unconstitutional?, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1,
p. 24 (1989).
